Confidence-building Measures: Helping to Ensure the Security of the Western Hemisphere

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The confrontations in the Alto Cenepa jungle in the heart of South America and the concomitant tensions on the borders of other States in Latin America have reactivated the topic of security in the western hemisphere. Similarly, the contacts and negotiations at the Meeting of Defence Ministers of the Americas, together with the debates of the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States (OAS), show that there is no consensus in the hemisphere on definitions of security and conflict-prevention mechanisms. Discussions in international organizations and among academics and intellectuals also point up the differing views on how to characterize the new context and fresh demands in the realm of security. How should the new risks be defined, and how might consensus be reached on them?

In Latin America, security threats in the past were mainly related to border disputes and conflicting ideologies. When the latter disappeared, new threats emerged such as drug trafficking and environmental hazards. The traditional issues, however, are still highly significant. How should the new hemispheric context be defined? Does a new institutional framework need to be created? Should the series of practices

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and actions intended to prevent the use of force be systematized in an international system? This is the context in which the topic of definitions and the conceptualization of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) must be addressed.

This topic is important in the present state of affairs in the hemisphere. The development of CBMs was one of the items on the agenda of the Meeting of Defence Ministers of the Americas. The Declaration of Santiago on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and the resolutions adopted at that high-level meeting of the OAS, held at Santiago, Chile, from 8 to 10 November 1995, are highly significant, as is pointed out later in this paper.

The headway already made in this context allows for further development of areas of policy coordination which will culminate in the creation of a new international security system, essentially cooperative in nature. CBMs are a pillar of preventive diplomacy. Their development into a cooperative security agreement and its full implementation will give concrete form to the quest for stability and peace.

After the cold war: major hemispheric trends in security

In the context of security, the signals have been mixed. The end of the cold war led to great expectations about the possibilities of quickly eliminating the main sources of conflict in the region and, at the same time, establishing new international mechanisms. One such mechanism in the western hemisphere was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). The disappearance of a threat from outside the region and the perception that democracies tend to resolve their differences without using force reaffirmed these positive prospects. However, the resurgence of border disputes, which led to open conflict, combined with differences among countries in terms of resources and compounded by the

emergence of new risks and threats, showed a much more complex panorama by the mid-1990s.

The emergence of conflicts and tensions indicates that there is a need for strong political will and a series of effective actions to prevent their possible escalation. It is necessary to prevent situations in which the actors—if they perceive their concrete interests to be seriously at risk—respond in ways that involve a high probability of the use of force. In a crisis situation, options are scarce. As a result, uncertainty increases and decisions are taken in a highly subjective context. This reaffirms the need to build a new, comprehensive international security system in the western hemisphere.

In the Americas, the end of the cold war had a number of different effects with respect to security. For the United States, it meant a basic change, which led it to redefine its foreign policy and, to a very significant degree, reduce and demobilize the forces devoted to regional affairs, in particular the South Commission. In this context, the United States redirected its policies to multilateral, global and hemispheric organizations and to the Latin American and Caribbean countries. Its priorities changed drastically.

The effects of the global change have been felt unevenly throughout Latin America. They are as diverse as the subregions that make up this mosaic of nearly 30 States. The changes are expressed in diverse ways and to differing degrees in each subregion. In Central America, the end of the cold war removed the main external component of security from the debate, making it possible to initiate a deeper process of national reconciliation, on the one hand and, on the other, a substantial change in political systems and institutions, including the armed forces. The demobilization and demilitarization process in this region has been profound. In the Caribbean subregion, some basic features of the cold war remain, and these have had a marked influence on the courses of action available there. These remnants are especially

evident in relations between the United States and Cuba. This situation has had a widespread effect on prospects for security in the subregion. It is here that the new risks have become especially apparent and that a new type of vulnerability has arisen. In South America, the end of the cold war did not have a major impact on perceptions of threat and the way in which the key security issues are defined. Tensions involving border disputes have been and still are more common there. The main change in South America is much more closely related to the processes of integration and political consensus-building than to the impact of the end of the cold war.

In this general framework, with complex international trends and diverse manifestations at the hemispheric level, the Latin American region now has the opportunity of making headway in helping to define the new international system. Few States in the region have the right combination of power attributes to have an exclusive impact at the international level. Reaching agreement on the definition of common goals would make it possible for the region to have a greater impact. Time is a critical factor in reaching agreed positions, defining policies and determining courses of action. The sooner the region develops some shared definitions, the greater the possibility that it will have an impact and the better the opportunities for designing efficient strategies.

The continual quest for peace

The region itself has already developed a number of different mechanisms and arrangements to deactivate tensions. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, there are two main instruments: the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was opened for signature in 1967 and had been signed by all Latin American countries by the end of 1995, and the Mendoza Accord and the Cartagena Declaration on the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, both signed in 1991, the former

by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and later Uruguay, and the latter by the presidents of the Andean countries.

A number of declarations by heads of State and Government have sought to establish the basis for stability and international security in the region. In this same context, the countries of the region have agreed to the principles and norms set forth in such multilateral global and hemispheric arrangements as the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the OAS.

Other important declarations in the field of security are the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho, the various declarations of the Contadora Group (1983–1987) and the Acapulco Commitment to Peace, Development and Democracy, proclaimed at the first Presidential Summit of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action (Rio Group), held in November 1987. Since that meeting, statements have been made on international and regional security at each summit meeting of the Group.

In addition, there is a rich network of contacts and declarations at the professional level in military institutions. Bilateral and multilateral meetings are being held regularly among the armed forces of the hemisphere. The multilateral meetings are institutionalized in annual conferences of heads of armies, navies and air forces.

Nevertheless, despite the good will demonstrated by these declarations issued by civilian leaders and high officials of the armed forces, tensions, conflicts and crises keep recurring in Latin America. Although these may be less intense than in other regions and the force used more limited, the consequences in terms of stability and regional peace are significant. Each crisis produces a serious setback in trust and reinforces traditional perceptions of threat.

For these reasons, a series of practical measures is needed to prevent a tense situation from occurring because of an error in judgement, with the consequent danger of

escalation. This is the area in which CBMs or CSBMs may be applied. Before a discussion of this subject, however, the present regional context where they will be applied must be specified.

The changing regional context

The regional context from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s is somewhat imprecisely defined. The main trends are still evolving and have not yet become clear; regional diversity is still the case. This can be seen in the following five crucial areas: (*a*) democratic processes, (*b*) economic growth, (*c*) integration processes, (*d*) regional stability and (*e*) relations with the United States. To these might be added the features of, and changes in, the concepts of security and defence themselves.

Building a hemispheric cooperative security system is key to preventing the emergence of crisis situations; developing a preventive system will make it possible to act in time and take specific actions to deal with tensions. The core element of cooperative security is the basic understanding of the dimension of relationship: that is, the security of any State depends on the perception of security of another State or States. Therefore, coordination of policies becomes the key to cooperative security. A second essential element is that concrete measures must be taken in an overall policy of *détente*, including political, economic, social and cultural measures. Similarly, a general policy of *détente* is not enough in itself; there must also be a high degree of focus and operationalizing on defence/military questions.

In that context, the development of CBMs in the field of defence plays an important role. The general backdrop of democratic understanding and closer economic ties can provide a rich environment for developing specific policies in the area of defence and military relations.

Confidence-building measures

CBMs are bilateral and multilateral actions designed to head off situations of crisis and conflict and to strengthen international peace and security. They enhance communication among different actors and create favourable conditions for mitigating perceptions of immediate threat and eliminating any elements of surprise. CBMs presuppose that the parties concerned have different interests and a low level of confidence in their relations. The application of such measures is essential when these differences are such that one of the parties could use force to achieve or defend its interests. In that situation, a mere misinterpretation could unleash an unwanted conflict.

There has been a lively debate on how broad or narrow CBMs should be. Some place them in a broad context of promoting security; and include economic, cultural and social exchanges. They include governmental and parliamentary political contacts, wide-ranging intergovernmental cooperation, diplomatic contacts and educational and cultural activities. Others focus on defence; in other words, the implementation of military measures. They include exchanging military information, developing consultative mechanisms regarding unusual military activities, cooperating with respect to military incidents and accidents, military contacts and visits, notification of military exercises, observation of specific military activities, training and education, and so on.

In the case of Latin America, I believe that agreements in different spheres must be systematized and that more emphasis must be placed on defence. This is where CBMs have a central value with respect to security. However, in view of the region's diplomatic style, it is important, in my view, not to polarize the debate on the scope of such measures. Rather, a pragmatic answer must be sought. In every situation of risk, tension or threat, determining the origin and the substantive factors thereof makes it possible to carry out a set of political,

diplomatic, economic and military measures. The success of the CBMs applied in the area of defence will depend on the general framework of relations. Their incremental or restricted character, in turn, will be proportional to the ease or difficulty experienced in dealing with the substantive aspects of differences of interests. The general aim must be to achieve mutually beneficial results and to place the parties' relations on a footing of confidence.

It should be borne in mind that CBMs are actions designed to turn a history of mistrust into a situation where, based on actions subject to evaluation, progress is made towards stability and then *détente*. If we believe in declarations, we make the future a matter of faith. If we carry out CBMs as part of a process of creating a climate of confidence, we can interact in a more transparent and predictable way, and diplomacy and politics can play a larger role. CBMs enable us to establish an objective model of evaluation, regardless of our faith in the degree of compliance.

The implementation of CBMs is a substantial part of the process of forming a cooperative security regime in the hemisphere. The Programme of Peace and Security in the Americas (FLACSCO) defined the concept of cooperative security as a system of State interactions which, by coordinating governmental policies, prevents and contains threats to national interests and prevents the perceptions which States have of such threats from turning into tensions, crises or open confrontations.

To implement this concept, the Programme seeks to make headway in ten areas: crisis prevention and maintenance of the status quo, regional modernization and equilibria, CBMs, arms control and limitation, disarmament, security regimes, bilateral responses, establishment of an institutional framework for cooperative hemispheric security, constructive involvement of the United States in developing a hemispheric security system, and the role of the United Nations.

We attach particular importance in this regard to the development of CBMs. The meeting in Chile gave substantial impetus which is reflected in the Santiago Declaration on Confidence-and Security-building Measures.[1]

The Santiago meeting

The results of the OAS conference on CBMs in Santiago may be said to be very positive. It should be noted that this was the first meeting of plenipotentiaries to analyse and agree on specific measures in this highly important area. Prior meetings had been largely meetings of experts or seminars. Participation in the Santiago meeting was high, in terms of both the number of delegations and the level of representation. In many cases representatives were vice-ministers. Of particular significance was the fact that the meeting adopted the Declaration by consensus. Moreover, two major bilateral agreements were signed at this meeting. The representatives of Ecuador and Peru signed an agreement on the establishment of specific measures to reduce tension in the Alto Cenepa area, and the under-secretaries for foreign affairs and defence of Chile and Argentina signed a bilateral agreement on a joint approach to defence and security between the two countries.

The following are the salient points of the Santiago Declaration:

1. The end of the cold war is facilitating the elimination of factors that breed mistrust and is leading to the identification of new modalities of cooperation.
2. There is a link between economic, social and cultural development and international peace and security.
3. Measures must be adapted to the specific conditions of each region.
4. Respect for international law, faithful compliance with treaties and the peaceful settlement of

disputes are of the utmost importance and form the basis for the development of CBMs.

5. The acceptance by all States of universal, equal and binding rules is an essential condition for achieving an effective international security system.

6. Only in a favourable climate can progress in limiting conventional weapons be achieved.

7. Identification of the risks, threats and challenges facing the Americas on the threshold of the next millennium must have priority. Settlements are to be sought as quickly as possible through negotiations, on the basis of justice and with full respect for international law and the treaties in force.

8. Member States agree to recommend the application of CBMs in the manner most suitable for each State. Eleven specific measures are listed. Their implementation will require regulation, to be adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS. A report on that subject may be submitted to the Assembly for consideration at its twenty-sixth regular session, with follow-up to be decided by the Assembly at that time.

Key aspects of the Santiago Declaration

Four main points emerge from the agreements adopted by consensus in the Santiago Declaration.

Security is a shared responsibility. "No State can sidestep its responsibility to participate in the designing of the new [international] system", said the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. José Miguel Insulza, when he opened the meeting. The Declaration reaffirmed that one essential condition is for States to subject themselves to equal rules that are also universal and binding.

Respect for international law. One of the underlying principles of the inter-American system is full, unrestricted

promotion of respect for international law and faithful compliance with treaty obligations. This perspective was reflected in the Declaration and reiterated in the statements made by various delegations. What is more, this point is of critical importance and has real impact on the question of the settlement of outstanding disputes.

Realistic proposals. The list of measures to be taken is extremely realistic. Establishing and putting them into practice on a gradual basis will ensure that they are implemented, thus making it possible to achieve the desired goals.

Adaptability. The proposed set of actions is marked by a high degree of flexibility. While some of the measures are general in nature, their scope of application is essentially local. The Declaration clearly states that CBMs must be adapted to the geographical, political, economic, social and cultural conditions of each region. Thus their application and implementation will be highly flexible.

It is also clear from the Declaration that verification will play an important role. One of the main conclusions of recent studies, and one that is being stated clearly in the United Nations, is that the international security systems of the twenty-first century will be characterized by efficient systems for verifying the implementation of agreements.

To sum up then, the Santiago Declaration and the progress it reflects constitute a response to the needs and security of different parts of the Americas. It identifies the interests and concerns that must be addressed and formulates appropriate responses to individual cases within the context of growing regional cooperation.

Implementation of the agreements will give impetus to four processes: (*a*) elimination of mistrust, overcoming basic fears and suspicions; (*b*) building a new atmosphere of trust in which to implement the agreements and establishing a new pattern of relationships; (*c*) deepening trust in the broad sense, leading to an increase in partnerships beyond those

based on trade; and (*d*) promoting cooperation in a local, subregional and continental context. These four processes define a type of progress under which the Americas can achieve the goals of real democracy, effective integration and lasting peace.

Notes

1 The Santiago Declaration, adopted in November 1995, was circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1371).

The Agreement on Subregional Arms Control of the "Dayton Agreement"

Donna Phelan

The Agreement on Subregional Arms Control, signed at the Ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Florence on 14 June 1996, is the result of six months of negotiations among the five Parties: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Parties used the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a starting point. This can be seen in many of the provisions of the Agreement.

The Article IV negotiations started on 18 December 1995 in Bonn, Germany and were conducted in Vienna from 4 January until 7 June 1996 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Vigleik Eide, the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The negotiations have taken place under the auspices of the OSCE, but the mandate came from Annex 1-B of the general Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the "Dayton Agreement"). The guiding principle of the negotiations was a "stable military balance at the lowest level of armaments".

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The Agreement consists of the basic document (with 15 articles) and six protocols: the Protocol on Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft; the Protocol on Exchange of Information and Notifications; the Protocol on Existing Types of Armaments; the Protocol on Inspection; and the Protocol on the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission.

Agreed limitations on armaments

As called for in the Dayton Agreement, the Parties set limits on five categories of armaments—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces of 75 mm calibre and above, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. These limits are based on the formula identified in the Dayton Agreement, frequently referred to as the 5:2:2 and 2:1 formula. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be limited to approximately 75 per cent of its current holdings. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will each be limited to approximately 30 per cent of the current Federal Republic of Yugoslavia holdings (Of the latter, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will have limits of two-thirds the total in each category of armaments, with the Republika Srpska's limits being the remaining one third of the total). The specific limits are indicated in Table 1.

The Agreement ensures that these limits are not just numbers on paper but will be rigourously subject to verification. It includes provisions for on-site monitoring of the destruction process, an extensive information exchange, an intrusive inspection regime and an impartial international role to assure that it is being implemented in good faith. It includes unambiguous definitions that clearly identify the armaments to be limited. Such stringent definitions are necessary to ensure that the information provided is precise, not simply based on the interpretation of one of the Parties.

Table 1: Limitations on Armaments

Party	Battle tanks	Armoured combat vehicles	Artillery pieces	Combat aircraft	Attack helicopters
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	1025	850	3750	155	53
Rep. of Croatia	410	340	1500	62	21
Bosnia and Herzegovina	410	340	1500	62	21
Fed. of Bosnia and Herzegovina	273	227	1000	41	14
Rep. Srpska	137	113	500	21	7

Methods for prescribed reductions

The Agreement contains specific provisions addressing the methods to be used to reduce armaments. These include destruction, conversion for non-military purposes, use for static display or ground instructional purposes, or export, with limits to the amount of armaments which may be reduced using methods other than destruction. With regard to each of these types of reduction except export, the Protocol on Reduction identifies specific procedures which must be followed to accomplish clearly-defined results. In other words, at the end of the procedure the piece of armament subject to reduction should no longer be able to be used for its original intended military purpose.

Implementation Timetable

The Agreement specifies a 12-month reduction period, at the end of which the agreed limits take effect. To measure progress, it further identifies two reduction phases, the first of which ends at the end of 1996. By 1 January 1997, the Parties must have reduced at least 40 per cent of their reduction liability for combat aircraft attack helicopters and

artillery, and 20 per cent of their reduction liability for battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles. The general implementation timetable is illustrated below.

Table 2: Implementation timetable



Consultative Commission

Another significant aspect of the Agreement is that it establishes the Subregional Consultative Commission to act as an implementation review body. The Commission provides a consultative mechanism for the Parties to work out differences that might arise in the course of implementation. Chairmanship of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission

will rotate among the Parties. The Parties have agreed, however, that the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-office will chair the meetings of the Commission in 1996.

Status of implementation

The Agreement entered into force upon signature on 14 June 1996 and the Parties have already begun organizational steps required for implementation. The Parties have already exchanged information on their holdings of armaments limited by the Agreement and reviewed the initial implementation schedule to ensure there were no questions concerning required notifications. The information, effective as of 1 July 1996, the start of a four-month baseline validation period for inspections, provides the basis for computing reduction liabilities.

The OSCE will assist the Parties to implement this Agreement. The OSCE participating States have been asked to identify personnel who would be available to assist the Parties in execution of the inspection regime. Under the terms of the Agreement, and with the concurrence of the Parties, up to three assistants may be designated to accompany inspection and escort teams during the conduct of these inspections.

Within the agreed limits, the Parties are free to structure, equip and train their forces as they choose. Because of the very unequal (current) force structure and armament levels among the Parties, one or two of the Parties will have some armament limits above their present holdings. This should not be regarded as an invitation to an "arms race", but should be seen as a necessity for future balance and stability in the area. The future levels in these categories will make it hard to build the superiority to start and win another war. Combined with growing transparency, this should, over time, contribute to stability and more cooperative and peaceful ways of living together.

Conclusion

The Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control will not guarantee stability in the area overnight. It is, however, a significant step on the path to this goal. The Dayton Agreement outlined a series of negotiations as part of the Agreement on Regional Stabilization. Completion of this Agreement now clears the way for the next building-block, the wider goal of "establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia" (the so-called Article V negotiations). Each step achieved in implementing the peace process helps to ensure that the whole region will become part of the process of increased European cooperation and integration.

Documentation Relating to Disarmament and International Security

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects)

Geneva, 3 May 1996

Article 1

Scope of application

1. This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby-traps and other devices, defined herein, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.

2. This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.

3. In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply the prohibitions and restrictions of this Protocol.

4. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the Government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.

5. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.

6. The application of the provisions of this Protocol to parties to a conflict, which are not High Contracting Parties that have accepted this Protocol, shall not change their legal status or the legal status of a disputed territory, either explicitly or implicitly.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purpose of this Protocol:

1. "Mine" means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.

2. "Remotely-delivered mine" means a mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not considered to be "remotely delivered", provided that they are used in accordance with Article 5 and other relevant Articles of this Protocol.

3. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.

4. "Booby-trap" means any device or material which is designed, constructed, or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.

5. "Other devices" means manually-emplaced munitions and devices including improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.

6. "Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

7. "Civilian objects" are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 6 of this Article.

8. "Minefield" is a defined area in which mines have been emplaced and "mined area" is an area which is dangerous due to the presence of mines. "Phoney minefield" means an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term "minefield" includes phoney minefields.

9. "Recording" means a physical, administrative and technical operation designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in official records, all available information facilitating the location of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices.

10. "Self-destruction mechanism" means an incorporated or externally attached automatically-functioning mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated or to which it is attached.

11. "Self-neutralization mechanism" means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated.

12. "Self-deactivating" means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example, a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition.

13. "Remote control" means control by commands from a distance.

14. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with the mine.

15. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced mines.

Article 3

General restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices

1. This Article applies to:

(a) mines;

(b) booby-traps; and

(c) other devices.

2. Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict is, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, responsible for all mines, booby-traps, and other devices employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy or maintain them as specified in Article 10 of this Protocol.

3. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any mine, booby-trap or other device which is designed or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

4. Weapons to which this Article applies shall strictly comply with the standards and limitations specified in the Technical Annex with respect to each particular category.

5. It is prohibited to use mines, booby-traps or other devices which employ a mechanism or device specifically designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly available mine detectors as a result of their magnetic or other non-contact influence during normal use in detection operations.

6. It is prohibited to use a self-deactivating mine equipped with an anti-handling device that is designed in such a manner that the anti-handling device is capable of functioning after the mine has ceased to be capable of functioning.

7. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians or civilian objects.

8. The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:

(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective. In case of doubt as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used;

(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or

(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination

thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

9. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are not to be treated as a single military objective.

10. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. These circumstances include, but are not limited to:

(a) the short-and long-term effect of mines upon the local civilian population for the duration of the minefield;

(b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning and monitoring);

(c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and

(d) the short-and long-term military requirements for a minefield.

11. Effective advance warning shall be given of any emplacement of mines, booby-traps and other devices which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

Article 4

Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines

It is prohibited to use anti-personnel mines which are not detectable, as specified in paragraph 2 of the Technical Annex.

Article 5

Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered mines

1. This Article applies to anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered mines.

2. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies which are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation in the Technical Annex, unless:

(a) such weapons are placed within a perimeter-marked area which is monitored by military personnel and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area. The marking must be of a distinct and durable character and must at least be visible to a person who is about to enter the perimeter-marked area; and

(b) such weapons are cleared before the area is abandoned, unless the area is turned over to the forces of another State which accept responsibility for the maintenance of the protections required by this Article and the subsequent clearance of those weapons.

3. A party to a conflict is relieved from further compliance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article only if such compliance is not feasible due to forcible loss of control of the area as a result of enemy military action, including situations where direct enemy military action makes it impossible to comply. If that party regains control of the area, it shall resume compliance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article.

4. If the forces of a party to a conflict gain control of an area in which weapons to which this Article applies have been laid, such forces shall, to the maximum extent feasible, maintain and, if necessary, establish the protections required by this Article until such weapons have been cleared.

5. All feasible measures shall be taken to prevent the unauthorized removal, defacement, destruction or concealment of any device, system or material used to establish the perimeter of a perimeter-marked area.

6. Weapons to which this Article applies which propel fragments in a horizontal arc of less than 90 degrees and which are placed on or above the ground may be used without the measures provided for in sub-paragraph 2 (a) of this Article for a maximum period of 72 hours, if:

(a) they are located in immediate proximity to the military unit that emplaced them; and

(b) the area is monitored by military personnel to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.

Article 6

Restrictions on the use of remotely-delivered mines

1. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines unless they are recorded in accordance with sub-paragraph 1 (b) of the Technical Annex.

2. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines which are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation in the Technical Annex.

3. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines other than anti-personnel mines, unless, to the extent feasible, they are equipped with an effective self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature, which is designed so that the mine will no longer function as a mine when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position.

4. Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of remotely-delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

Article 7

Prohibitions on the use of booby-traps and other devices

1. Without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances to use booby-traps and other devices which are in any way attached to or associated with:

(a) internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals;

(b) sick, wounded or dead persons;

(c) burial or cremation sites or graves;

(d) medical facilities, medical equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation;

(e) children's toys or other portable objects or products specially designed for the feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or education of children;

(f) food or drink;

(g) kitchen utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military locations or military supply depots;

(h) objects clearly of a religious nature;

(i) historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; or

(j) animals or their carcasses.

2. It is prohibited to use booby-traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material.

3. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3, it is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies in any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent, unless either:

(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective; or

(b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning sentries, the issuing of warnings or the provision of fences.

Article 8

Transfers

1. In order to promote the purposes of this Protocol, each High Contracting Party:

(a) undertakes not to transfer any mine the use of which is prohibited by this Protocol;

(b) undertakes not to transfer any mine to any recipient other than a State or a State agency authorized to receive such transfers;

(c) undertakes to exercise restraint in the transfer of any mine the use of which is restricted by this Protocol. In particular, each High Contracting Party undertakes not to transfer any anti-personnel mines to States which are not bound by this Protocol, unless the recipient State agrees to apply this Protocol; and

(d) undertakes to ensure that any transfer in accordance with this Article takes place in full compliance, by both the transferring and the recipient State, with the relevant provisions of this Protocol and the applicable norms of international humanitarian law.

2. In the event that a High Contracting Party declares that it will defer compliance with specific provisions on the use of certain

mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex, sub-paragraph 1 (a) of this Article shall however apply to such mines.

3. All High Contracting Parties, pending the entry into force of this Protocol, will refrain from any actions which would be inconsistent with sub-paragraph 1 (a) of this Article.

Article 9

Recording and use of information on minefields,mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices

1. All information concerning minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices shall be recorded in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Annex.

2. All such records shall be retained by the parties to a conflict, who shall, without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of such information, to protect civilians from the effects of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in areas under their control.

At the same time, they shall also make available to the other party or parties to the conflict and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all such information in their possession concerning minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices laid by them in areas no longer under their control; provided, however, subject to reciprocity, where the forces of a party to a conflict are in the territory of an adverse party, either party may withhold such information from the Secretary-General and the other party, to the extent that security interests require such withholding, until neither party is in the territory of the other. In the latter case, the information withheld shall be disclosed as soon as those security interests permit. Wherever possible, the parties to the conflict shall seek, by mutual agreement, to provide for the release of such information at the earliest possible time in a manner consistent with the security interests of each party.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 10 and 12 of this Protocol.

Article 10

Removal of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices and international cooperation

1. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices shall be cleared, removed, destroyed or maintained in accordance with Article 3 and paragraph 2 of Article 5 of this Protocol.

2. High Contracting Parties and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility with respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in areas under their control.

3. With respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices laid by a party in areas over which it no longer exercises control, such party shall provide to the party in control of the area pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent permitted by such party, technical and material assistance necessary to fulfil such responsibility.

4. At all times necessary, the parties shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on the provision of technical and material assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfil such responsibilities.

Article 11

Technological cooperation and assistance

1. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Protocol and means of mine clearance. In particular, High Contracting Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

2. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations System, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

3. Each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance through the United Nations System, other international bodies or on a bilateral basis, or contribute to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.

4. Requests by High Contracting Parties for assistance, substantiated by relevant information, may be submitted to the United Nations, to other appropriate bodies or to other States. These requests may be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them to all High Contracting Parties and to relevant international organizations.

5. In the case of requests to the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within the resources available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, may take appropriate steps to assess the situation and, in cooperation with the requesting High Contracting Party, determine the appropriate provision of assistance in mine clearance or implementation of the Protocol. The Secretary-General may also report to High Contracting Parties on any such assessment as well as on the type and scope of assistance required.

6. Without prejudice to their constitutional and other legal provisions, the High Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate and transfer technology to facilitate the implementation of the relevant prohibitions and restrictions set out in this Protocol.

7. Each High Contracting Party has the right to seek and receive technical assistance, where appropriate, from another High Contracting Party on specific relevant technology, other than weapons technology, as necessary and feasible, with a view to reducing any period of deferral for which provision is made in the Technical Annex.

Article 12

Protection from the effects of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices

1. Application

(a) With the exception of the forces and missions referred to in sub-paragraph 2(a)(i) of this Article, this Article applies only to missions which are performing functions in an area with the consent

of the High Contracting Party on whose territory the functions are performed.

(b) The application of the provisions of this Article to parties to a conflict which are not High Contracting Parties shall not change their legal status or the legal status of a disputed territory, either explicitly or implicitly.

(c) The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to existing international humanitarian law, or other international instruments as applicable, or decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations, which provide for a higher level of protection to personnel functioning in accordance with this Article.

2. Peace-keeping and certain other forces and missions

(a) This paragraph applies to:

(i) any United Nations force or mission performing peace-keeping, observation or similar functions in any area in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and

(ii) any mission established pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and performing its functions in the area of a conflict.

(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head of a force or mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:

(i) so far as it is able, take such measures as are necessary to protect the force or mission from the effects of mines, booby-traps and other devices in any area under its control;

(ii) if necessary in order effectively to protect such personnel, remove or render harmless, so far as it is able, all mines, booby-traps and other devices in that area; and

(iii) inform the head of the force or mission of the location of all known minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in the area in which the force or mission is performing its functions and, so far as is feasible, make available to the head of the force or mission all information in its possession concerning such minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices.

3. Humanitarian and fact-finding missions of the United Nations System

(a) This paragraph applies to any humanitarian or fact-finding mission of the United Nations System.

(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:

(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and

(ii) if access to or through any place under its control is necessary for the performance of the mission's functions and in order to provide the personnel of the mission with safe passage to or through that place:

(aa) unless on-going hostilities prevent, inform the head of the mission of a safe route to that place if such information is available; or

(bb) if information identifying a safe route is not provided in accordance with sub-paragraph (aa), so far as is necessary and feasible, clear a lane through minefields.

4. Missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross

(a) This paragraph applies to any mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross performing functions with the consent of the host State or States as provided for by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, where applicable, their Additional Protocols.

(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:

(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and

(ii) take the measures set out in sub-paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Article.

5. Other humanitarian missions and missions of enquiry

(a) Insofar as paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article do not apply to them, this paragraph applies to the following missions when they are performing functions in the area of a conflict or to assist the victims of a conflict:

(i) any humanitarian mission of a national Red Cross or Red Crescent society or of their International Federation;

(ii) any mission of an impartial humanitarian organization, including any impartial humanitarian demining mission; and

(iii) any mission of enquiry established pursuant to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, where applicable, their Additional Protocols.

(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall, so far as is feasible:

(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and

(ii) take the measures set out in sub-paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Article.

6. Confidentiality

All information provided in confidence pursuant to this Article shall be treated by the recipient in strict confidence and shall not be released outside the force or mission concerned without the express authorization of the provider of the information.

7. Respect for laws and regulations

Without prejudice to such privileges and immunities as they may enjoy or to the requirements of their duties, personnel participating in the forces and missions referred to in this Article shall:

(a) respect the laws and regulations of the host State; and

(b) refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and international nature of their duties.

Article 13

Consultations of High Contracting Parties

1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult and cooperate with each other on all issues related to the operation of this Protocol. For this purpose, a conference of High Contracting Parties shall be held annually.

2. Participation in the annual conferences shall be determined by their agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The work of the conference shall include:

(a) review of the operation and status of this Protocol;

(b) consideration of matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties according to paragraph 4 of this Article;

(c) preparation for review conferences; and

(d) consideration of the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines.

4. The High Contracting Parties shall provide annual reports to the Depositary, who shall circulate them to all High Contracting Parties in advance of the conference, on any of the following matters:

(a) dissemination of information on this Protocol to their armed forces and to the civilian population;

(b) mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes;

(c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of this Protocol and any other relevant information pertaining thereto;

(d) legislation related to this Protocol;

(e) measures taken on international technical information exchange, on international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance; and

(f) other relevant matters.

5. The cost of the Conference of High Contracting Parties shall be borne by the High Contracting Parties and States not parties participating in the work of the conference, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 14

Compliance

1. Each High Contracting Party shall take all appropriate steps, including legislative and other measures, to prevent and suppress violations of this Protocol by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

2. The measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this Article include appropriate measures to ensure the imposition of penal sanctions against persons who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of this Protocol, wilfully kill or cause serious injury to civilians and to bring such persons to justice.

3. Each High Contracting Party shall also require that its armed forces issue relevant military instructions and operating procedures and that armed forces personnel receive training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities to comply with the provisions of this Protocol.

4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult each other and to cooperate with each other bilaterally, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations or through other appropriate international procedures, to resolve any problems that may arise with regard to the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Protocol.

Technical Annex

1. Recording

(a) Recording of the location of mines other than remotely-delivered mines, minefields, mined areas, booby-traps and other devices shall be carried out in accordance with the following provisions:

(i) the location of the minefields, mined areas and areas of booby-traps and other devices shall be specified accurately by relation to the coordinates of at least two reference points and the estimated dimensions of the area containing these weapons in relation to those reference points;

(ii) maps, diagrams or other records shall be made in such a way as to indicate the location of minefields, mined areas, booby-traps and other devices in relation to reference points, and these records shall also indicate their perimeters and extent; and

(iii) for purposes of detection and clearance of mines, booby-traps and other devices, maps, diagrams or other records shall contain complete information on the type, number, emplacing method, type of fuse and life time, date and time of laying, anti-handling devices (if any) and other relevant information on all these weapons laid. Whenever feasible the minefield record shall show the exact location of every mine, except in row minefields where the row location is sufficient. The precise location and operating mechanism of each booby-trap laid shall be individually recorded.

(b) The estimated location and area of remotely-delivered mines shall be specified by coordinates of reference points (normally corner points) and shall be ascertained and when feasible marked on the ground at the earliest opportunity. The total number and type of mines laid, the date and time of laying and the self-destruction time periods shall also be recorded.

(c) Copies of records shall be held at a level of command sufficient to guarantee their safety as far as possible.

(d) The use of mines produced after the entry into force of this Protocol is prohibited unless they are marked in English or in the respective national language or languages with the following information:

(i) name of the country of origin;

(ii) month and year of production; and

(iii) serial number or lot number.

The marking should be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects, as far as possible.

2. Specifications on detectability

(a) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced after 1 January 1997, such mines shall incorporate in their construction a material or device that enables the mine to be detected by commonly-available technical mine detection equipment and provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass.

(b) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced before 1 January 1997, such mines shall either incorporate in their construction, or have attached prior to their emplacement, in a manner not easily removable, a material or device that enables the mine to be detected by commonly-available technical mine detection equipment and provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass.

(c) In the event that a High Contracting Party determines that it cannot immediately comply with sub-paragraph (b), it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this Protocol that it will defer compliance with sub-paragraph (b) for a period not to exceed 9 years from the entry into force of this Protocol. In the meantime it shall, to the extent feasible, minimize the use of anti-personnel mines that do not so comply.

3. Specifications on self-destruction and self-deactivation

(a) All remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines shall be designed and constructed so that no more than 10% of activated mines will fail to self-destruct within 30 days after emplacement, and each mine shall have a back-up self-deactivation feature designed and constructed so that, in combination with the self-destruction mecha-

nism, no more than one in one thousand activated mines will function as a mine 120 days after emplacement.

(b) All non-remotely delivered anti-personnel mines, used outside marked areas, as defined in Article 5 of this Protocol, shall comply with the requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation stated in sub-paragraph (a).

(c) In the event that a High Contracting Party determines that it cannot immediately comply with sub-paragraphs (a) and/or (b), it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this Protocol, that it will, with respect to mines produced prior to the entry into force of this Protocol, defer compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and/or (b) for a period not to exceed 9 years from the entry into force of this Protocol.

During this period of deferral, the High Contracting Party shall:

(i) undertake to minimize, to the extent feasible, the use of anti-personnel mines that do not so comply; and

(ii) with respect to remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines, comply with either the requirements for self-destruction or the requirements for self-deactivation and, with respect to other anti-personnel mines comply with at least the requirements for self-deactivation.

4. International signs for minefields and mined areas:

Signs similar to the example attached and as specified below shall be utilized in the marking of minefields and mined areas to ensure their visibility and recognition by the civilian population:

(a) size and shape: a triangle or square no smaller than 28 centimetres (11 inches) by 20 centimetres (7.9 inches) for a triangle, and 15 centimetres (6 inches) per side for a square;

(b) colour: red or orange with a yellow reflecting border;

(c) symbol: the symbol illustrated in the Attachment, or an alternative readily recognizable in the area in which the sign is to be displayed as identifying a dangerous area;

(d) language: the sign should contain the word "mines" in one of the six official languages of the Convention (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) and the language or languages prevalent in that area; and

(e) spacing: signs should be placed around the minefield or mined area at a distance sufficient to ensure their visibility at any point by a civilian approaching the area.

Warning Sign for Areas Containing Mines

Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects)

Vienna, 13 October 1995

Article 1

It is prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices. The High Contracting Parties shall not transfer such weapons to any State or non-State entity.

Article 2

In the employment of laser systems, the High Contracting Parties shall take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. Such precautions shall include training of their armed forces and other practical measures.

Article 3

Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol.

Article 4

For the purpose of this Protocol "permanent blindness" means irreversible and uncorrectable loss of vision which is seriously disabling with no prospect of recovery. Serious disability is equivalent to visual acuity of less than 20/200 Snellen measured using both eyes.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The following is a list of books maintained in a permanent collection at the Centre for Disarmament's Reference Library for the use of diplomats, United Nations staff members, Disarmament Fellows, students, researchers and representatives of non-governmental organizations working in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

The Centre wishes to thank the publishers, institutions and organizations which sent the books for their continued collaboration with its Library.

A Farewell to Arms?: Russia's Struggles with Defense Conversion. Kevin P. O'Prey. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995. 142 p.

After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines. Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams. Washington, D.C., Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995. 554 p.

Arms Control Toward the 21st Century. Gregory J. Rattray, ed. Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. 348 p.

Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures. Ralph A. Cossa, ed. Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995. 160 p.

Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics. Aaron Karp. New York, Oxford University Press, in association with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1996. 228 p. New York,

Changing European Security Landscape. Clive Archer and Olli-Pekka Jalonen, eds. Tampere, Finland, Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1995. 283 p. (Research Report No. 63)

Defence Doctrines and Conversion. Bjorn Moller and Lev Voronkov, eds. Brookfield, Vermont, Darthmouth Publishing Company, 1996. 161 p.

Landmines: Legacy of Conflict. Rae McGrath. Oxford, United Kingdom, 1994. 86 p. (A manual for development workers)

Nuclear Energy Safety Challenges in the Former Soviet Union: A Consensus Report of the CSIS Congressional Study Group on Nuclear Energy Safety Challenges in the Former Soviet Union. Robert E. Ebel, Project Director. Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1995. 94 p.

Nuclear Weapons After the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization and Proliferation. Eric Arnett, ed. New York, Oxford University Press, in association with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1996. 150 p.

Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s. Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr. NSW, Australia, Allen & Unwin, in association with the Australian Foreign Policy Publications Programme and the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 1996. 222 p.

Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1996. 605 p.

Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation. Jacob Bercovitch, ed. Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. 279 p.

Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament. Melvin L. Best, Jr., John Hughes-Wilson and Andrei A. Piontkowsky, eds. Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 330 p. (Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Workshop on Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., 6-10 April 1995)

Towards a Regional Arms Register in the Asia Pacific. Ralph A. Cossa, ed. Honolulu, Hawaii, Pacific Forum CSIS, 1995. 60 p. (A Report from the Second Meeting of the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Singapore, May 1995)

Towards A War-Free World. Joseph Rotblat, ed. River Edge, New Jersey, World Scientific Publishing Company, 1995. 192 p. (The Annals of the 44th Pugwash Conference, 1994)

U.S. Counterproliferation Initiative: Issues and Implications. Brahma Chellaney. New Delhi, India, Centre for Policy Research, 1996. 36 p.

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A periodic review by the United Nations